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The Impact of EDI on a Hybrid Governance Structure
Mary R. Lind, NCA&T, lindm@aurora.ncat.edu
Introduction
Increasingly electronic data interchange (EDI) is utilized to change how interorganizational transactions are
conducted (Premhumar and Ramamurthy, 1995; Cash and Konsynski, 1985). The governance of
interorganizational transactions has been the object of intense research (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975,
1981; Granovetter, 1985, Oliver, 1990). Little is known; however, regarding the impact of EDI on the
governance of these interorganizational transactions.
In this research the theorized impact of electronic data interchange on interorganizational transaction
governance is examined. The research context for this study is presented, followed by a summary of initial
findings, and a discussion of the potential impact of this research.
Theorized Impact of EDI on Interorganizational Transaction Governance
Two polar forms (markets and hierarchies) for describing transaction governance have been routinely
criticized (Williamson; 1991: 269) for ignoring hybrid forms of transaction governance. Ring and Van De
Ven (1992) proposed two hybrid forms of transaction governance: recurrent and relational. Ring and Van
De Ven's (1992) criteria for differentiating the four governance types are "risk of the deal" and "reliance on
trust among the parties."
Market based transactions are short term in nature between highly autonomous agents. In most cases these
market based transactions involve the economically efficient transfer of property rights with few rich
interactions (Zmud, Lind, and Young; 1990) between the transacting agents (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992).
"Hierarchical transactions usually involve the production of wealth or the rationing of resources between
superiors and subordinates" (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992, p. 485). The hierarchical transaction governance
form works best for transaction situations that have highly uncertain outcomes, occur frequently, and
require unique or specific investment (Williamson, 1985, Ring and Van De Ven, 1992). In the recurrent
transaction governance form of Ring and Van De Ven (1992), the transactions involve repeated exchange
of assets of moderate transaction specificity. The transactions are relatively short term and the agents in the
transaction are autonomous. Because these agents have a recurring relationship, they become more socially
embedded in the transaction process developing a high level of mutual trust between the agents and quickly
become aware of any non-efficiency agent motives. Relational transaction governance involves a long term
relationship characterized by a high level of trust between the agents that resulted from recurrent
transacting. The property exchanged in relational transactions involves highly, very specific investments
dependent on the results of the transaction. Any disputes are resolved through efficiency and equity
outcomes sought in the long term recurrent relationship.
Through interpersonal relationships, a social embeddedness is established where the agents develop a
mutual trust that discourages malfeasance (Granovetter, 1985). Through this trust, the agents can transact
with each other confident that malfeasance will not appear (As Granovetter (1995) notes there are
exceptions to this such as embezzling, confidence schemes, etc.). Thus the long term recurrent and
relational governance types afford opportunities for the agents to become socially embedded which in turn
increases trust and lowers the risk of the transaction (Figure 1).

Automating the Recurring Transaction Process
Adding to research on the adoption and use of EDI (Premkumar and Ramamurthy, 1995; Malone, Yates,
and Benjamin, 1987), Hart and Saunders (1996) found power and trust to be critical factors. The objective
of this research is to examine the effect of EDI on an existing recurring transaction process characterized by
a high level of trust between the transacting agents.
Agents in a recurring transaction process develop over time a high level of mutual trust in how to conduct
the transaction. This takes the form of predictably in dealing with the transacting partner. Through
interpersonal embeddedness (Blau, 1964, Granovetter, 1985), the agents become familiar with each other's
expectations for completing the transaction. This interpersonal embeddedness thus results in a mutual trust
that reduces uncertainty regarding the transaction and the need for additional information search to reduce
this uncertainty.
The introduction of an EDI technology to standardize and speed up the transaction flow between the agents
may change the nature of the agents' transacting relationship. When the agents change long standing norms
of transaction behavior, a period of heightened uncertainty regarding the transaction process may exist and
result in lower trust between the transacting partners. Over time the transacting partners will have
opportunities to reduce this uncertainty and return to their former trust level, provided opportunities for
opportunistic behavior are not created and the EDI technology is reliable (Figure 2).

Hypothesis #1: In a recurring transaction process, the short term reaction to the use of EDI in the
transacting process will be a lower level of trust between the transacting agents.

Hypothesis #2: In a recurring transaction process, the long term reaction to the use of EDI will be a return
to the level of trust in effect prior to EDI implementation, provided EDI does not provide opportunities for
opportunistic behaviors by the agents and is reliable.
Research Design
Efficiency and trust metrics will be collected over a fourteen month period from transacting agents. The
agents are motor carriers who request credentials from state agencies in an eight state Midwest area. For
two months prior to EDI implementation, efficiency and trust metrics will be collected from the transacting
agents. After EDI implementation, the trust metrics will be collected every two weeks from the transacting
agents (front line workers at the motor carriers and state agencies) with efficiency metrics on the credential
turnaround time provided by the EDI system.
This recurrent credential transacting context provides a longitudinal research design where the time lagged
effect of EDI on agent trust can be examined. Also the relationship between EDI system performance and
trust will be examined.
Results
The baseline data collection, period 1, for the pre-EDI transacting process is ongoing at the time of this
paper. Preliminary results indicate that there exists between the transacting partners a high degree of trust in
their current credentialing process. By the time of the conference, data from the period immediately after
EDI implementation, period 2, will allow examination of the short term impact of EDI on the transacting
agents' mutual trust.
Conclusions
This study will provide a fine grained analysis of EDI impact. It is generally accepted that EDI increases
transaction efficiency by speeding up the transaction cycle and the accuracy of the data exchanged. These
efficiency improvements will improve market governance situations that are characterized by short term
(quick in and quick out) relationships for the trading partners. Little is known however of the impact of EDI
on the recurrent transacting relationships. If trust is permanently reduced, it could lead to a more
adversarial relationship between the transacting agents. Also it is possible that the depersonalization of the
recurrent transacting using EDI technology, may result in the transaction agents acting more
opportunistically. They may take short cuts or finding ways to improve their position relative to their
transacting agents.
Thus this research will not just examine not only the impact of EDI on transaction efficiency and the
trading partners' work processes, but its impact on the transacting agents' social embeddedeness
relationship. In particular, will EDI reduce mutual trust and lead to more opportunistic behavior by the
recurrent transacting agents? Will EDI result in a change in the trading partners' mutual trust level?
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Motivation for this Research
Within the United States, before many organizations can
operate they have to be certified. In many cases, the
regulation is imposed on a state by state basis so that there is
no single body that can provide certification throughout the
United States. When this certification has to be reissued on a
frequent basis, this can be a time consuming activity for both
the state agencies and the organizations desiring certification.
In particular the motor carrier industry has to obtain such
certification from the states in which its trucks will operate.
This entails each motor carrier dealing directly with the state
credentialing agency in that state. Also, carriers may have to
obtain credentialing for trucks that infrequently travel through
a state or may be oversized for standard hauling.
Theoretical Basis for Research
This state/ carrier relationship is neither market nor
hierarchy which are characterized by Williamson (1990) as polar
modes. Williamson (1990) proposes a hybrid interorganizational
structure between the market and hierarchy poles. Through this
bilateral dependence these hybrids develop coordinating
mechanisms to support this interdependence and long-term
contracts for dispute settlement equitable to both parties. A
true hybrid midway between markets and hierarchies would be

characterized by semi-strong financial incentives for each party,
an intermediate level of bureaucratic processes, and semi-strong
adaptability.
The context of this hybrid is positioned more closely in the
favor of the hierarchy due to the legal power of the state
credentialing agency, i.e. to do business in the state the
carrier must conduct a transaction (s) with the state agency.
The transaction that is the basic unit of analysis in this
context is the credential process that the carrier conducts with
each state. The credentials are produced on a truck by truck
basis so that they are very asset specific and must be displayed
in the truck if the truck is to do business in a particular
state. Thus with this very real control that the state's have
over the carriers' asset specificity, there is a very real
bilateral dependence between the state and the carriers.
The dependence of the carrier on the states for
certification imposes a governance cost on the carriers that is
enacted through the credentialing transaction. This
certification then allows the carriers to service the
transportation requests of their customers. The governance costs
consists of the labor to prepare the credential request, the time
to transmit the credential to the state agency, the time it
takes to clarify any problems, the labor for the state to process

the credential, and the time for the completed credential to be
transmitted back to the carrier. Many small carriers will use an
intermediary called a service provider to submit the credential
request for the carrier for a fee.
In an attempt to reduce governance costs associated with the
credentials, an electronic data interchange system is being
developed. This system will automate the credential processing
for the states and carriers. While the EDI approach is to
streamline and standardize the credentialing process, each state
has its own laws particular to that state. An added cost to
implementing this credential technology is the cost of changing
state mandated laws to adhere to a standardized EDI credential
transaction.
Each state has mandated laws and regulations that govern
credentialing in that state such as original signatures and
credential cards that must be placed in the cabs of trucks. These
mandated barriers usually result from legislation, executive
orders, or popular demand. Other barriers include organizational
issues that reflect problems with how the state or carrier is
structured to implement the One-Stop technology. These
organizational issues can result from jurisdictional overlaps,
unclear responsibilities, conflicting operating and
administrative policies and priorities, and cultural differences.

The socio/technical interface of the technology with its users
(states and carriers) is an additional barrier to One-Stop
adoption involving the person/ technology interface. If One-Stop
is to be used and to be nationally deployable, it must fit the
work styles and needs of the states and carriers. Thus within
this hybrid governance context of states and carriers to
successfully implement an EDI system the states, in particular,
must seek to collaborate and reduce the barriers and the
governance costs to the carriers.
Research Basis for Assessing the Impact of Electronic Data
Interchange.
A time based process model will be used to analyze the
impact of EDI on the states and partners. The dynamic approach
proposed will not only model perceptual, behavioral, and
procedural changes but will also assess the impact of these
changes on partner effectiveness and efficiency. Many
organizational theorists (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Markus
and Robey, 1988; Monge, 1990) have argued that such process
models may provide insights about the nature of organizational
change that are not supplied by the correlation (variance)
analysis models currently used by most researchers in this area.
In barrier reduction, the partners must change the
credentialing procedures within the states agencies and motor

carriers. Thus barrier management is effectively change
management. These state and carrier organizational units will be
examined as hybrid interorganizational systems (Williams, 1990;
Van de Ven, 1994) to assess the ability of these states and
carriers to adaptively institute changes resulting from the
collaboration effort focused on reducing the barriers to One-Stop
implementation. These organizational changes may entail not only
changes in work procedures but changes in the culture of these
organizations.
Structural interaction mechanisms that allow intensive and
high quality interaction among the states and motor carriers will
be necessary to enable these organizational and cultural changes
(Adams, 1980) which will in turn affect the performance of OneStop in the credentialing process. As the partners develop their
interorganizational relationships, Ring and Van De Ven (1994)
argue that such collaboration enables congruent decisions which
then should allow the partners to reduce the barriers to One-Stop
implementation. Thus it is argued that intensive collaboration
among the partners will result in congruent barrier management
which will determine the effectiveness of One-Stop after
implementation.
Research Context
The Federal Highway Administration is sponsoring this

operational test of carrier EDI in the Mid-West in collaboration
with the eight partner Mid-Western states. The partners have
developed a set of metrics to assess the impact of the EDI
technology. The metrics are focused on cycle time to process a
credential, productivity impact of EDI on the credential worker,
satisfaction level of the states and carriers with the EDI
system, and the effectiveness of the barrier reduction process.
The research design for this study is a pretest/ posttest.
We are currently in the baseline period where we are obtaining
baseline values for each of the metrics. These results will be
included in the paper that is submitted for the proceedings. By
the time of the conference, we will be into implementation data
collection which begins on July 1, 1996. At the conference I
will provide preliminary results obtained during the posttest
period.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to use the hybrid governance
structure to explain this technology development and
implementation effort. This context is complicated by the
barriers that need to be removed to enable the ultimate
deployment of this EDI technology on a nation wide basis. This
pretest/posttest research design will allow for nice quantitative
analysis of EDI impact and should provide interesting qualitative

information on the technology development and implementation
process.
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